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Abstract: Cyber systems that serve government and military organizations must cope with unique threats and 
powerful adversaries. In this context, one must assume that attackers are continuously engaged in offence and 
an attack can potentially escalate in a compromised system. This paper proposes an approach to generate 
defensive responses against on-going attacks. We use Attack-Defence Trees (ADTrees) to represent situational 
information including the state of the system, potential attacks and defences, and the interdependencies 
between them. Currently, ADTrees do not support automated response generation. To this end, we develop a 
game-theoretic approach to calculate defensive responses and implement our approach using the Game 
Theory Explorer (GTE). In our games, Attackers and Defenders are the players, the pay-offs model the benefit 
to each player for a given course of action, and the game’s equilibria is the optimal course of action for each 
player. Finally, given the dynamic nature of cyber systems, we keep our ADTrees and the corresponding game 
trees up-to-date following the well-known OODA (observe, orient, decide, act) loop methodology.  
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1. Introduction 
Cyber systems are becoming highly complex with ever-increasing dependencies both internally as well as with 
strategic partners and commercial service providers. Military organizations and critical businesses are also 
relying heavily on such cyber systems to meet their operational demands and to support mission execution. At 
the same time, cyber attacks are becoming stealthy and sophisticated, posing potentially very high damaging 
impact. In this context, a holistic framework for responding to cyber attacks becomes essential and it must 
encompass several functions including:  
i) efficient collection of cyber situational information,  
ii) analysis of possible attacks,  
iii) determining the courses of actions in response, and  
iv) taking the appropriate actions.  
 
This paper focuses mainly on the ‘determining the courses of actions in response’ component of a deployed 
cyber system. We assume that situational information including the system state and parameters, and attack 
and defence related information is available. In this work, we systematically represent the situational 
information using Attack-Defence Trees (ADTrees) (Kordy, Mauw, & Radomirovic, Attack-defence trees, 2014). 
ADTrees improve the widely used attack trees formalism, by including not only the actions of an attacker, but 
also possible counteractions of a defender. The root node in an ADTree represents the attacker’s (or 
defender’s) goal and the children of a given node represents its refinement into sub-goals. Each node can have 
one child of the opposite type, representing the node’s counteraction, which can be refined and countered 
again. The leaves of an ADTree represent the basic actions of an agent, which need not be refined any further.  
 
Formally, ADTrees extend the formalism of defence trees (Bistarelli, Fioravanti, & Peretti, 2006), where 
defensive measures are not refined and can only be attached to leaf nodes. ADTrees can also be seen as 
merging attack trees and protection trees (Edge, Dalton, Raines, & Mills, 2006) into one formalism. Protection 
trees are AND-OR trees depicting how defensive measures can be refined into simple actions. Given the high 
expressivity and intuitiveness of ADTrees, complemented with strong mathematical foundations, they seem as 
an appropriate choice to describe and analyze cyber situational information. 
 
 
 
Currently, ADTrees are used to analyse and quantitatively assess security scenarios. They do not compute the 
course of actions as responses against on-going attacks. We propose to address this limitation by applying 
game theory to ADTrees. Game theory provides a rich resource of mathematical and algorithmic tools to study 
the problems of competition or conflict. We view a cyber response problem as a game between an attacker 
who is competing to inflict some form of attack and a defender who is attempting to prevent the attack. A 
game-solver then computes the best responses to defend the cyber system from various attacks launched by 
an attacker.  
 
Kordy et al. in (Kordy, Mauw, Melissen, & Schweitzer, 2010) have already established a two-way mapping and 
equivalence between games and ADTrees. However, they consider games of a highly restricted form that are 
not suitable in our context because of the following limitations: 
 They use only binary pay-offs; this implies that there are only two possible outcomes: the attacker 
wins and the defender loses, and vice versa.  
 They assume existence of perfect information implying that both players have full knowledge of all 
opponent's actions.  
 Strict alternation of player's moves is required. Assuming an alteration between the attacker’s and 
the defender’s moves may be unrealistic in our case. 
 Finally, the mappings in (Kordy, Mauw, Melissen, & Schweitzer, 2010) result in an increased 
abstraction from reality. Each mapping consists in generating a suitable syntactic object called an 
ADTerm that maps the binary pay-offs of the game tree. The way in which such syntactic objects 
represent the real world is unclear.  
 
In this paper, we address the limitations in (Kordy, Mauw, Melissen, & Schweitzer, 2010) and define a game 
model that has the capability to represent the cyber response problem. Section 2 presents a motivating 
scenario that places our work in context. Section 3 provides the fundamental definitions of our game model 
and Section 4 defines the mapping between ADTrees and the basic form of our game model. Section 5 then 
extends our basic game to allow modelling of complex cyber response problems. Section 6 defines our 
approach for updating game trees following the OODA loop and Section 7 outlines our conclusions. 
2. Motivating Scenario 
Consider a military organization that has deployed a small, dedicated cyber system to support one of its 
missions. The mission might be for a Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) to track an object in a 
geographical region. The cyber system performs functions like storing and processing the image and location 
data sent by the RPAS in order to generate the navigation plans (NP). This cyber system can also be a subnet 
separated by a firewall within a large distributed network operated by the military organization.  
 
Assume that the dedicated cyber system consists of a file server (FS) which stores the image and location data, 
a navigation plan generator (NPG) that computes the future navigation routes for the RPAS, and three client 
workstations (WS) that control the RPAS. FS offers file transfer (ftp), remote shell (rsh) and secure shell (ssh) 
services to WS so that they can access the image and location data. NPG on the other hand allows WS and FS 
to execute commands on it using the ssh service. A firewall, which is intended to protect FS and NPG, only 
allows ftp, rsh and ssh traffic from WS to FS and NPG and blocks all other traffic. Let us further assume that 
there are vulnerabilities in ftp and ssh daemons, in the task scheduler of NPG, and in the address space 
resolution of FS’s operating system. The access control list defines that a user has read and execute privileges 
while a root can read, write and execute. Finally, the goal of the attacker is to breach the integrity of the 
system so that the mission fails. 
 
In ADTrees, attacks are represented as circles and defences as rectangles. Refinements are indicated by solid 
edges between nodes and counteractions are indicated by dotted edges. Attacks and defences can be refined 
conjunctively and disjunctively. A conjunctive refinement of a node has an arc connecting the edges going 
from this node to its children. A disjunctive refinement has simple edges.  
 
The ADTree in Figure 1 shows how an attacker can modify critical mission data in two different ways and 
provides possible defence choices. In the first attack (see node “NPG root”), the attacker can obtain root 
privileges on NPG: first by gaining root privileges on WS via a key logging technique or by performing a buffer 
overflow attack on the ssh daemon. Then the attacker can use the interactive “cmd.exe” command. The 
 
 
defender can disable the task scheduler to prevent the execution of the cmd.exe command; use a two-factor 
authentication scheme against the key logging attack; and stop the ssh service to prevent buffer overflow. 
 
 
Figure 1 Example ADTree representing the attack-defence scenario for a military organization 
 
In the second case, the attacker must obtain root privileges on FS (see node “FS root”). To achieve this, she 
must first gain user privileges on FS and then perform a local buffer overflow attack. The defender can prevent 
the latter attack by using adaptive memory management techniques. To obtain user privileges on FS, the 
attacker can, starting as a user on WS:  
i) exploit the ftp vulnerability and use the rsh service to establish trust between WS and FS, or  
ii) perform a buffer overflow using the vulnerability in the ssh daemon.  
The defender can prevent this attack by:  
i) modifying the access control list, or 
ii) configuring the firewall to drop ftp packets from WS and blocking the rsh service, and  
iii) stopping the ssh service. 
3. Game Model 
We use ADTrees to express situational information and to analyze attacks in the system. However, we note 
that ADTrees are only a language to describe and formalize attacks and defences; they do not compute 
responses against attacks by themselves. We propose to solve the cyber response problem by applying game 
theory on ADTrees. We define a game between an Attacker who is competing to inflict some form of attack 
and a Defender who is attempting to prevent the attack. A game-solver then provides the cyber responses to 
defend the system from the attacker.  
 
In this section, we define the following basic components of our games: the game’s players, knowledge states 
of the players, game’s moves, and the pay-off function. The next section discusses an approach to generate 
our games from ADTrees.  
3.1 Game’s Players 
Our model considers interaction between two players: a Defender and an Attacker. In general, considering a 
single Defender-player implicitly assumes that the Defender has nearly full knowledge of the state of the 
system and that she can implement any determined course of actions effectively. However, in comparison to 
centralized control, a model with localized decision-making seems sensible. To this end, one approach consists 
 
 
in defining multi-player games with a number of Defender-players. Another approach consists in coordinating 
several two-player games of a Defender against the Attacker, where each game makes a localized decision, 
and the overall solution is the composition of local results. We adopt the latter approach by defining two-
player local games focusing on specific locations or critical resources in the system (e.g., a local game where 
the Attacker attempts to gain root privileges on FS and the Defender aims to protect FS). We choose the latter 
approach because it allows us to define game models for each resource in the system and to take into account 
the distinct trust levels associated with each resource. For example, a cross-boundary located server has lower 
trust than an on-site server. Our game model addresses this aspect by adjusting the pay-off values based on 
the `risk appetite’ parameter. 
 
The Attacker attempts to breach the defences of the system in order to disrupt missions. In our example, the 
goal of the Attacker is to breach the integrity of a mission either by compromising FS or NPG. Assuming a single 
attacker implies that she has full knowledge of possible attack strategies and has centralized control for 
inflicting her actions on the system. Therefore, having a single Attacker-player provides a model with a very 
strong attacker and it may be desirable to retain this model, irrespective of the aforementioned models for the 
defender.  
3.2 Game’s Moves and Knowledge States of the Players 
When considering the game moves, we highlight a conceptual distinction between games and ADTrees, 
specifically regarding the notion of strategy. In a game, a strategy is a complete algorithm that tells a player 
what to do for every possible situation throughout the game. In ADTrees, concrete actions are only at the 
leaves and all other nodes define a refinement relationship using conjunction and disjunctive operators. 
Therefore, in an ADTree, the strategy is the connection between a concrete action and the goal that drives it.  
 
For example, for the ADTree in Figure 1, an attacker can reach her goal following four attack strategies:  
 a1={WS user, ftp-rhosts & rsh, local-bof FS} 
 a2={WS user, sshd-bof, local-bof FS} 
 a3={WS key logger, interactive cmd.exe} 
 a4={ sshd-bof, interactive cmd.exe} 
All actions within an attack strategy must be implemented to breach integrity, but implementing one of the 
four attack strategies is sufficient. While a1 and a2 allows the attacker to gain root privileges at FS, a3 and a4 
compromises NPG. There are three defence strategies to protect FS: 
 d1={drop ftp or stop rsh, stop ssh}  
 d2={memory management} 
 d3={modify ACL}. 
and two defence strategies to protect NPG:  
 d4={task scheduler} and  
 d5={2nd auth factor, stop ssh}.  
Our goal here is to have the game’s moves model the attack-defence strategies of each player.  
 
The knowledge state of a player defines what the player knows of its moves and the moves of other players. 
The simplest case considers perfect Information where both players have full knowledge of all the moves of 
the game. In this work, we consider more complex models for knowledge states where the moves and pay-offs 
of both players are not fully known to either the Attacker or Defender. In particular, our game model allows 
moves where: 
1. The Defender cannot distinguish the choices made by an Attacker and vice versa.  
2. Game’s moves are committed temporally independently and/or simultaneously. 
3. A player may choose not to take any action that changes the state of the system (e.g., a defender can 
simply monitor the network for possible intrusions). 
4. There is uncertainty in observations and expected pay-offs. 
We believe that such complex game models can sufficiently represent the cyber security scenarios like the one 
described in Section 2.  
 
 
3.3 Pay-off Function 
Pay-offs model the benefit to each player for a given course of actions/game’s moves. In zero-sum games, the 
gains of one player are equivalent to the losses of the other. We note that pay-offs are also critical in capturing 
essential notions like the `risk appetite’. Assigning realistic pay-offs is a hard problem and is out of the scope of 
the work presented here. Instead, we start from a basic game model with arbitrary pay-offs where the pay-off 
to the Attacker is simply a measure of the amount of work the Defender has to do. Therefore, when the 
Defender has to take one action the Attacker receives a pay-off of 1. Intuitively, the goal of each player is to 
commit their game moves such that they maximize their own pay-offs.  
4. Mapping Attack-Defence Trees and Games 
In this section, we define a basic game and provide its solution. We then describe the notion of equilibrium 
and its relationship with the cyber response problem.  
4.1 The Basic Game Model and the Game Trees 
To generate our basic game, we start from the ADTree that models the overall security of the system and 
compute all attack and defence strategies, as described in Section 3.2. In this section, we aim to model a two-
player local game, focusing on a specific resource in the system (FS), as discussed in Section 3.1. 
 
The players are clearly the Attacker and Defender; the game’s moves that model the choices of each player are 
denoted as labels on the edges and take the form:  
 
Player.InformationState.ActionType. 
 
Player can take one of the two values A or D representing the Attacker and the Defender, respectively. 
InformationState is a number associated with each action representing the depth of the knowledge state of 
the player while making the game’s move (see Section 3.2). In the simple example below, the decision for both 
players comes from their first information state. Finally, the ActionType refers to the concrete steps taken by 
each player – in our game, action types correspond to attack and defence strategies. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Basic game tree focussing on FS 
 
For the local game focusing on FS, two attack strategies allow the Attacker to gain root privileges on FS:  
 a1={WS user, ftp-rhosts & rsh, local-bof FS} 
 a2={WS user, sshd-bof, local-bof FS}. 
 
On the other hand, the Defender can protect FS – or respond to Attacker’s moves – using one of the three 
defence strategies:  
 d1={drop ftp or stop rsh, stop ssh},  
 d2={memory management}, and  
 d3={modify ACL}.  
 
 
 
For the sake of readability, action types in Figure 2 are denoted using the above attack and defence strategy 
identifiers. The Attacker must choose from a1 and a2 in order to implement its attack and, in response, the 
Defender must choose from d1, d2 or d3. 
 
A player's game strategy can be extracted by following a path from the apex to a leaf. The path presents the 
moves of both players. In Figure 2, the Defender circumscribes the two nodes that model the result of the 
Attacker's moves. We use this notation, following (Egesdal, et al., 2015) (Savani & Stengel, 2014), to denote 
the fact that the Defender cannot distinguish these nodes because it does not know the choice made by the 
Attacker. In other words, nodes circumscribed using a rounded rectangle are treated as a single information 
state for the Defender (see Section 5.2). Although the moves of the Defender are structurally presented as 
following the Attacker’s moves, semantically there is no temporal dependency. This means that in our game 
model the moves are not assumed to be committed in any particular order and can even occur simultaneously. 
 
The leaves of the game tree are the pay-offs and they measure the benefits to each player for their course of 
actions. For example, if the Defender chooses to strengthen the network by using memory management 
(strategy d2) as a defence, although she can prevent the Attacker from gaining root privileges at FS, the 
number of tasks that the Defender performs is significant, thus the pay-off of 7 to the Attacker. We note that, 
although we have assigned the pay-offs here in a simple manner, we tried to take into account the risk 
appetite and the sensitivity of the impact of attack and defence choices.  
4.2 Solving the Games 
We use a web-based game solver called the Game Theory Explorer (GTE) (Egesdal, et al., 2015) to obtain 
solutions for our games. The solution consists in computing the equilibria, which in our case describes the best 
game strategies for both players. Attacker and Defender are in equilibrium if the Attacker is choosing the best 
strategy she can, taking into account the Defender’s strategy, while the Defender’s decision remains 
unchanged. Similarly, the Defender is choosing the best strategy she can, taking into account the Attacker’s 
decision, while the Attacker’s decision remains unchanged. 
 
Figure 3 illustrates a part of the solution of our basic game (Figure 2) as provided by the GTE. The 2x3 matrices 
characterize the pay-offs of both players (player 1 being the Attacker and player 2 the Defender). Each of the 
three rows EE1, EE2 and EE3 denote an equilibrium, with corresponding expected pay-offs. 
 
Strategic form:  
 
2 x 3 Payoff player 1                        2 x 3 Payoff player 2 
 
        D.1.d1  D.1.d2  D.1.d3                     D.1.d1  D.1.d2  D.1.d3 
A.1.a1       4       6       5             A.1.a1       5       4       3 
A.1.a2       3       7       6             A.1.a2       3       5       4 
 
EE = Extreme Equilibrium, EP = Expected Payoffs 
 
Rational: 
EE 1   P1: (1) 2/3 1/3 EP= 5    P2: (1) 1/2 1/2 0 EP= 13/3  
EE 2   P1: (2)   1   0 EP= 4    P2: (2)   1   0 0 EP=    5  
EE 3   P1: (3)   0   1 EP= 7    P2: (3)   0   1 0 EP=    5  
 
Figure 3 Solution of the basic game 
 
Let us look at the equilibria in detail. 
 (Row 1) EE1 consists of player 1 (the Attacker A) playing a game strategy labelled (1) and this strategy 
is for her to make the first game move A.1.a1 with probability 2/3 and the second game move A.1.a2 
with probability 1/3. As a response, player 2 (Defender D) can make game moves D.1.d1 and D.1.d2 
with equal probabilities of 1/2 each, but does not play D.1.d3. By following this game strategy, the 
Attacker can expect a pay-off of 5 and the Defender’s expected gains are 13/3.  
 (Row 2) The equilibrium EE2 consists of a game strategy labelled (2) where the Attacker only makes its 
first game move A.1.a1 with probability 1. As a response, the Defender also makes only the game 
 
 
move D.1.d1 with probability 1. The expected pay-offs through this game strategy is 4 for the Attacker 
and 5 for the Defender.  
 (Row 3) The final equilibrium consists of game strategy (3) where the Attacker only makes its second 
game move A.1.a2 with probability 1 and the Defender responds to it through the game move D.1.d2 
with probability 1. The expected pay-offs for the Attacker is 7 and for the Defender is 5.  
 
We can use the equilibria to identify the best defence responses against on-going attacks. For example, in 
game strategy (2), when the Defender identifies that there is an on-going attack on FS following attack 
strategy a1, the best response for the Defender is to drop ftp packets between WS and FS and to stop ssh 
service on FS (i.e., apply d1). This allows the Defender not only to stop the on-going attack but also to 
strengthen her system without paying heavily in terms of the amount of Defender tasks required. 
 
Our basic game model satisfies the 2nd and partially the 1st requirement listed in Section 3.2. However, to 
accommodate complex models – satisfying all four requirements – we need to extend our basic game so that 
our cyber response problem can be modelled holistically.  
5. Extended Game Models 
Our basic game model assumes a static scenario where the players consider all options upfront and make a 
strategy choice, which fixes a definite course of action for each player. The limitations of the basic model are: 
 A player may choose not to take an action that changes the state of the system. For example, a 
Defender may only monitor the network to observe the situation and an Attacker may perform 
reconnaissance. Such wait conditions may be necessary, but were not included in the basic game 
model. To address this, we add a wait game move to the strategy sets of the players (see Figure 6). 
 In networked systems, several unexpected system events and on-going attacks may go unnoticed. 
Since such observations are critical for successful execution of missions, we need to enhance our 
game trees and introduce probabilistic branching that takes into account the uncertainties about 
what has happened (see Section 5.1). 
 In our basic game both players know the pay-offs to each other. This is an unrealistic assumption 
since it implies that each player knows the impact of a course of action on both itself and, critically, on 
its opponent. To address this limitation, we introduce randomization to capture variable pay-offs (see 
Section 5.2). 
5.1 Randomization to Capture Uncertain Observation 
 
 
Figure 4 Game tree with uncertain observations 
 
Figure 4 illustrates an example of how randomization in the game tree can model uncertainty of observation. 
The Attacker can choose either attack a1 or a2 (notation has been simplified here for readability). However, 
there is a probabilistic branch after her action, which leads to the choices for the Defender. Therefore, the 
Defender knows that there are 3/4 chances that the Attacker has committed a1 and 1/4 chances of a2 being 
played. In contrast, the Defender in our basic game did not know if Attacker plays a1 or a2. 
 
 
5.2 Randomization to Capture Variable Pay-offs 
We consider four cases to introduce randomization of pay-offs. In the first game (Figure 5, row 1), there is an 
initial randomized branch with two sub-trees and corresponding pay-offs at the leaves. There are two 
possibilities of pay-offs and these are known to both players. As discussed in Section 4.1, observe that there is 
no rounded rectangle for the Attacker and two separate ones for the Defender, one for each case. In the 
second game (Figure 5, row 2), the Attacker does not know the pay-off possibility, but the Defender does, 
since we have an Attacker who is unable to distinguish the initial probabilistic branch. In the third game (Figure 
5, row 3), neither the Attacker nor the Defender knows which pay-offs will be the case and in the final game, 
the Attacker knows which pay-off possibility will be the case, but the Defender does not. 
 
We note that, although the same initial pay-offs are assigned to all the game trees, the solutions are very 
different (see col. 2 in Figure 5). The number and the kind of game strategies in each equilibria and expected 
final pay-offs for both the players vary significantly since their knowledge states change drastically in each 
game. Following our extended game models, we can generate a rich set of game trees that precisely represent 
the complex requirements of our scenario.  
 
 
 
EE 1  
P1: (1) 0 1 0               EP= 7/2  
P2: (1) 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0   EP= 
15/2  
 
 
 
EE 1  
P1: (1) 0 1                 EP= 3  
P2: (1) 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0   EP= 9/2  
 
 
EE 1  
P1: (1) 4/5 1/5             EP= 5/2  
P2: (1) 0 7/9 2/9           EP= 9/5  
 
EE 2  
P1: (2)   0   1             EP=   6  
P2: (2) 0   0   1           EP=   3  
 
EE 3  
P1: (3)   1   0             EP= 5/2  
P2: (3) 0   1   0           EP=   2  
 
 
EE 1  
P1: (1) 0 0 0 1             EP= 6  
P2: (1) 0 0 1               EP= 3  
 
Figure 5 Game trees with randomization to capture variable pay-offs and corresponding game solution 
 
 
6. Deploying Game Models with the OODA Loop  
ADTrees capture cyber situational information in a static manner and support analysis of risks off-line. Cyber 
systems on the other hand are dynamic, with many system changes (e.g., migration of virtual machines, failure 
of storage disks) over time. Game trees are also a static formulation of interacting choices – a single tree 
cannot express the evolution of state over time. To address this issue, we propose to update our ADTrees and 
game trees in the events of system changes. We adopt the OODA loop methodology (Hightower, n.d.) as 
follows: 
 Observe – collate information about cyber incidents and system changes. 
 Orient – arrange collated information on suitable ADTrees. 
 Decide – formulate games in concurrence with the updated ADTrees and solve them. 
 Act – raise alerts to the system administrator with possible cyber response solutions to implement an 
appropriate action.  
The loop reverts to the Observe step after Act and continues similarly thereafter. As an example, consider that 
at time instance t, it is observed that the Defender patches the ssh daemon and the Attacker is scanning for a 
new set of IP addresses in the network (wait game move). During orientation, attack a1 is disabled and the 
corresponding defence d1 need not “stop the ssh service” anymore (let d1’={drop ftp or stop rsh}). Therefore, 
we update the game tree in Figure 2 and obtain the following game tree, which is then used to Decide about 
cyber responses.  
 
 
 
Figure 6 Updated game tree at time instance t 
7. Conclusions 
We proposed an approach to generate cyber defence responses by mapping situational information from 
ADTrees on to game trees. A variety of game models were demonstrated to support complex cyber response 
analysis, implemented by the GTE tool. Finally, we also account for dynamic system behavior by adapting our 
models following the OODA loop. 
 
This work is an initial study that intends to understand the applicability of ADTrees and game theory in solving 
the problem of cyber responses generation. Our future work will first focus on defining a cost function that 
takes various functional and security parameters as input and provides the pay-off values as output. We will 
then focus on improving the scalability of our approach and perform experiments on realistic cyber testbeds.   
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